Following the attempt by Alesina and Guiliano (2013) to measure global culture and to project these measurements onto real choropleth geographical world maps, we utilize the data from the World Values Survey (WVS) to arrive at robust measurement scales of global economic, political and social values and to assess Turkey's place within them. Our study, which is based on 92,289 representative individuals with complete data in 68 countries, representing 56.89% of the global population, looks at hard-core economic values in these countries. From our new nine dimensions for the determination of the geography of human values, based on a promax factor analysis of the available data, we use six factor analytical scores to calculate a new Global Value Development Index, which combines: avoiding economic permissiveness; avoiding racism; avoiding distrust of the army and the press; avoiding the authoritarian character; tolerance and respect; and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy. Turkey is ranked 25, ahead of several EU member countries. But there are still considerable defi cits concerning the liberal values compo-1 Th e authors are grateful to two anonymous referees and an editor of the journal for comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper.
Introduction
Whatever the way, the European Union (EU) candidate Turkey's internal and external developments will sharply divide opinions around Europe and beyond (Clesse and Tashan, 2004 , Szymanski, 2015 , 2016a , 2016b Wasilewski, 2017a Wasilewski, , 2017b Wodka, 2017) . And in whatever way, the scientifi c study of opinion and value structures and processes in the context of EU enlargement with Turkey, the other candidate countries and in the EU-28 and beyond are an absolute necessity. Following the new attempt by Alesina and Guiliano (2013) , to measure global culture and to project these measurement scales onto real choropleth geographical world maps, we also utilize the freely available data from the World Values Survey (WVS) at the University of Michigan 2 to arrive at such robust and similar measurement scales of global economic, political and social values and we attempt to place Turkey within them.
Th e problems analyzed in this empirical paper are not new to international political science, or also to Polish political science. Szymanski, 2016b, writing on the political culture of contemporary Turkey, had already remarked "basic, primary obstacles to the democratic consolidation, connected fi rst of all with [i.e. Turkey's] attitudinal and behavioral dimensions, namely an exceptional set of elements of the political culture of the elites (to a large extent the ruling elites but also the political elites generally) -authoritarian tendencies, lack of consensual culture (and the occurrence of political polarization) as well as the narrow understanding of democracy." (Szymanski, 2016b: 18) Our central question in this essay within this framework is thus what is Turkey's place on realistic new maps of global values, given that the existing sociological cross-national value comparisons are insuffi cient? Th e aim of this essay is thus two-fold: to build such new global value maps, and to see what are the implications for Turkey and its unhappy relationship with the EU, well-known in international social science (see Haferlach, Tekin & Wodka, 2017; Wodka, 2017) . Th e study will hopefully become not only a contribution to the academic debate on the subject, but also a useful tool for decision makers in international politics. Th e methodology put forward here can also help decision makers to assess the value structures in other EU enlargement candidate countries, and also can help the decision makers in other cases to arrive at sounder judgments about economic, social and political basic values, prevalent in a given country.
Th e systematic use of large-scale comparative international opinion data, above all from the WVS, which we undertake here, is not new and is no longer restricted to the sociological discipline. More and more, the economics discipline becomes aware of the enormous possibilities to address the contentious issues of culture in the economics of a global society, characterized more and more by migration and the globalization of world religions. Global value research, which originally grew out of the desire of large transna-Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny 5(1)/2017 tional corporations (i.e. the IBM Corporation) to adapt to ever more complex and pluralistic cultural patterns of their clients and staff (Minkov, 2009; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013) is by now a long-established social science discipline, and it is a pity how little the overall European public and especially the decision makers took notice about its results in the debate regarding Turkish EU-accession thus far. Sociology, for sure, did its "homework" and there are even attempts to arrive at realistic assessments of global Muslim and Arab Muslim opinion in a comparative perspective. Sociology, already looking back on a very long, established tradition of the empirical sociology of religions, which dates back to the 19 th Century (Morel, 2003) , contributed greatly over the last two decades towards the understanding of global Muslim opinion (Diez-Nicolas, 2007 , 2010 Moaddel, 2002 Moaddel, , 2003 Moaddel, , 2008 Tessler, 2003, just to mention a few).
At this stage, the comparative social scientist and economist might wonder whether perhaps all the debate that rages on the issue under scrutiny here -i.e. Turkey's place as a European nation -is really well-informed by the evidence from quantitative social science on the subject. Turkey, the country of origin of around some 70% of the 3.5 million Muslims residing in Germany, 3 from the early beginnings was an integral part of the WVS Project. Th e failure of the European political debate to take into account the results of systematic fi eld research in social science research on the issue of Turkey is all the more depressing, since the systematic use of data from the WVS in advanced social science Turkish studies is now commonplace (Erişen, Erişen and Özkeçeci-Taner, 2013; Negrón-Gonzales, 2012; Sarigil, 2011; Şimşek, 2013; Yeşilada, 2002; Yeşilada and Noordijk, 2010) .
Confronted by a European public debate, which is threatening to become "essentialist" on both sides of the great "Turkish EU-membership divide", it is necessary to recall at the outset that for advanced research in the economics discipline, the question about the relationship between economics and religion is not new. By mid-February 2018, it has again become clear that neither France nor Germany really want Turkey to become a member of the European Union: Times, February 15, 2018 4 Th e essay by Barro and McCleary (2003) is a good example of how economic research today uses data from the WVS Project to study the relationship between religion, denominations and economic growth. Alesina (2013) ; Alesina and Angeletos (2005) ; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007); Alesina and Guiliano (2010 , 2011 ; Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012); and Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) all show how the economic discipline can indeed gain hard-core, quantitative and valuable insights from Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny 5(1)/2017
"France and Germany have particular problems with the prospect of a further opening of their doors to Turkish migrants, and French president Emmanuel Macron did not pull his punches when President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Paris last week. He told him bluntly that Turkey has no foreseeable chance of joining the EU, simply confi rming what everyone in this town has long known. Whenever the EU dares to talk about enlargement these days, the focus is exclusively on the western Balkans agreement. Erdogan's authoritarian methods have been a convenient excuse for long-fi ngering accession discussions, although the need to safeguard the agreement with Ankara on keeping and looking aft er Syrian refugees in return for dollops of EU cash has seen the union play down its criticism of the Turkish leader" Irish
comparative knowledge about such phenomena as generalized trust and social capital, individualism, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and perception of poverty, and religious practice for economic processes. In this essay, we defi ne "cultures" largely following Alesina and Guiliano (2013) on a global scale, and also in Turkey.
In our attempt to openly test the oft en unspoken but politically very relevant contention by many members of the European political class and the public at large that in the end Turkey does not really belong to Europe because it's a Muslim country 5 (see below) by advanced international data and advanced quantitative methods, like Promax oblique factor analysis, we use 30 indicators from the WVS. Although some of our indicators are diff erent from those used by Alesina and Guiliano (2013) , there are lots of similarities between the two approaches, and a high correspondence between the choropleth geographical maps of global values, presented by Alesina and Guiliano, and our own attempts will emerge. Th ere are, nevertheless, some diff erences in the approach: we uniformly use promax oblique factor analysis to test the relationships between the value factors. Our chosen indicators represent the best available choice of WVS data in terms of interview coverage, and in addition, our results -in contrast to those reported by Alesina and Guiliano, also contain important social, economic and political background variables.
In the course of our research, we are going to present data not only at the national, but also at the regional level of the nearly 70 nations compared here, analyzing the factor analytical scores of our new nine global value indicators, derived from over 90.000 representative interviews across the globe and also in the Turkish regions, and we will compare their performance with those of all other regions of the world with available data and a suffi cient number of reported WVS interview partners per region (i.e. n>30). In that process we will discover the still existing deep regional value cleavages which exist in Turkey, benefi ting the ruling conservative Islamist AKP, whose power-base is the Turkish speaking urban and rural poor Sunni Muslim majority population from Anatolia.
In designing this research project, we made the discovery that hitherto existing attempts in sociology to draw maps of human values across nations (i.e. Hofstede and Inglehart), valuable as they may be, are really still unsatisfactory in terms of country coverage, issue coverage and also methodologies used. Th us, besides background variables such as age, gender, education level, life satisfaction, educational values, values of responsibility, general political attitudes on the left -right spectrum, identifi cation with democracy, general social capital variables (trust in people, in the armed forces, in the Press) and religious attitudes, our study in particular looks at hard-core economic values in all the countries of the world with available data, namely:
1. Competition good or harmful (competition policy, admission of a free market) 2. Migration policy (prevent people from coming) (migration policy) 3. Important child qualities: hard work (attitudes towards work) 4. Justifi able: avoiding a fare on public transport (attitudes towards public services; limited morality) 5. Justifi able: cheating on taxes (tax evasion and shadow economy) 6. Justifi able: claiming government benefi ts even if one is not entitled to them (attitudes towards public services, work attitudes) 7. Justifi able: someone accepting a bribe (corruption) Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny 5(1)/2017 8. Rejecting neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers (economic and social discrimination) 9. Neighbours: People of a diff erent race (economic and social discrimination) 10. University is more important for a boy than for a girl (economic and social discrimination). Fascinating relationships between the underlying factors, explaining these 30 variables, and which render themselves for objective and value-free comparisons will emerge, and we will also be able to name for each country of the world the exact position it has on those factors. We will be able to show the regional cleavages for those factors, and we will be able to say whether Turkey's population has attitudes which are diff erent from or are similar to other current EU-candidate countries, such as Macedonia. We will be able to judge whether in principle there exist really fundamental value diff erences between Turkey and the rest of Europe, disqualifying Turkey ex ante from EU membership -or not. Th ese results will hold irrespective of recent political tendencies in the country, connected with the Gezi Park protest movement.
Th e rest of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a general picture of Turkey ante portas. Section 3 discusses the political economy and sociology of global values. Th e oft en overlooked role of the shadow economy in assessing global values is analyzed in Section 4. Th e methodology is outlined in Section 5. Section 6 is on re-analysis of Inglehart's data. Th e fi nal factor analytical model is presented in Section 7, followed by the new choropleth maps of global human values in Section 8. In Section 9, we discuss regional value diff erences at the sub-national level and in the fi nal Section Turkey -a Torn Country? Conclusions and Perspectives are presented.
Turkey ante portas
In our view, the culturalist "debate" about "Islam in Europe", focusing on "Islam as such", leaves no room for the legitimate concerns of those who indeed fear that the secular Republic established by Kemal Atatürk is progressively being undermined by an increasingly authoritarian political leadership, which won yet another victory at the polls in 2014, all the protest movement in the major cities around Gezi Park notwithstanding.
6 But this essay is not on Turkish internal politics, but, if you like, on comparative values "as such", regardless of one's stand in the oft en controversial and bitter cleavages now surfacing in Turkish society.
Most "offi cial", i.e. government-think tank related foreign policy experts in the European Union would agree with the statement of the current chief Turkey country expert at the Polish Institute for International Aff airs (PISM), Karol Wasilewski (2017a) , who reached the conclusion that:
" (Neriah, 2018) In a scathing analysis of Turkey's current political scene, Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab aff airs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, and a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center for Public Aff airs, who served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority, writes (Ben Menachem, 2017) Also, an increasing number of geo-strategic analysts from the United States Defense establishment begin to view Erdogan's policies as a real new danger for the free world (see among others, the Rand Corporation study Larrabee, 2018 Toghill (2012) , found that the real issues in Turkish accession have nothing to do with legal criteria, economic requirements or international relations. Th e problem, Toghill argued, is really simply that of admitting a large Muslim country into the EU. But it's often forgotten that the then French overseas department of Algeria with a largely Muslim population was an integral part of the then "European Economic Community" from January 1 st , 1958 right to July 5 th , 1962, the day when Algeria became independent. 9 When Algeria joined the European Economic Community, no Copenhagen criteria were in place, and a bitter counter-insurgency war was being fought with tens of thousands of victims. So, adherents of Turkey's EU-accession might say that Muslim Algeria as a colony involved in a bitter civil war was welcome as a European Economic Community member, but Turkey is not.
With more than 30 years since the Turkish Republic's application to join the European Economic Community in 1987, and more than 20 years since the country was declared eligible to join the EU in 1997, the EU one way or the other, will have to reach a decision 10 on how to proceed. In 1997 Turkey was declared eligible to join the EU. Turkey's involvement with European integration dates way back to 1959 and includes the Ankara Association Agreement (1963) for the progressive establishment of a Customs Union (ultimately set up in 1995).
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Countries preparing to join the EU today are: Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo as potential candidates and Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey 12 as offi cial candidates 13 . As a glance at the United States Central Intelligence Agency "World Factbook" will convince every reader of this article very quickly, 14 these countries are characterized by the following Muslim share of population: Turkey (99.8%), Albania (56.7%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (40%), Macedonia (33.3%), Montenegro (19.1%), and Serbia (3.1%). Carkuglu and Rubin (2003) viewed the question of EU membership as one of Turkey's most important foreign policy problems and an important domestic issue as well. Th e EU's behaviour was seen as a rejection of its principles by those who hate, look down on, or discriminate against Turkey. Th e full reasons for the slow pace of advance towards membership include Turkey's population size, its relative poverty, its Muslim population, its limits on democracy, its human rights situation, the Armenian, Kurdish and Cyprus questions, the confl ict with Greece, the structure of the economy, and domestic opposition to Turkey's westernization. Regional security was seen then as the only issue of full mutual agreement. Only a single so-called negotiation Chapter (science and research) of the 33 Chapters was completed on June 12, 2006, while all the other membership negotia-Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny 5(1)/2017 tion Chapters remain contentious. 15 Minority rights play an important role in the underlying confl icts (Yilmaz, 2012) .
Th us, it is no wonder that a number of experts, including Szymański, in his (2015) study thought that the pre-accession process of Turkey will be continued but its pace and course will depend to a large extent on the position of the Union's main powers, the clear vision of the EU as well as the economic/political situation and public feelings in Europe. In this whole conjunction, the question of underlying value diff erences plays an important role. Alesina and Guiliano (2013) defi ne culture to comprise measurable tendencies in the following variables: generalized trust, individualism versus collectivism, family ties, generalized vs. limited morality, attitudes toward work and perceptions of poverty and religion.
Th e political economy and sociology of global values
Th e most studied cultural trait, according to Alesina and Guiliano (2013) is the measure of generalized trust toward others. Th e importance of this trait cannot, as argued by Alesina and Guiliano, be overemphasized. Th ey mention that every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust; and economic backwardness in the world can, following economist Kenneth Arrow, be explained precisely by the lack of mutual confidence. Th e WVS asks respondents around the globe: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful when dealing with others?" Nowadays, there is, as Alesina and Guiliano highlight, a vast literature showing a close connection between trust and economic development. Generalized vs. limited morality are also, Alesina and Guiliano argue, relevant in fostering economic development. Limited morality exists where cooperative behavior is extended only towards immediate family members, whereas generalized morality exists where cooperative behavior is extended toward everyone in society.
Among the most prominent competing international sociological attempts to defi ne and measure the development of human values we should specify the two current major approaches dominating international social science: Hofstede's theory of global values and Inglehart's and his associates' studies of world values.
First, we mention Geert Hofstede. Th is Dutch psychologist and his associates really stood at the beginning of comparative international value research. Initially, they based their empirical studies on global culture on the statistical analysis of the staff of the US transnational enterprise IBM in 40 diff erent countries around the world (see also Hofstede, 2001; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013) . According to Hofstede and his school, there are four to six basic clusters of international value systems, and they are all defi ned along the scales of how diff erent national societies handle ways of coping with inequality, ways of coping with uncertainty, the relationship of the individual with her or his primary group, and the emotional implications of having been born as a girl or as a boy. Hofstede defi nes these dimensions of national culture as: power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, uncertainty avoidance index, long-term orientation and indulgence versus restraint. 5(1)/2017
Between 1990 and 2002, Hofstede replicated these dimensions in six other cross-national studies on very diff erent populations from consumers to airline pilots, covering between 14 and 28 countries. In the 2010 third edition of his book 'Cultures and Organizations: Soft ware of the Mind', scores on the dimensions are listed for 76 countries.
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But -perhaps somewhat surprisingly for large sections of the European public, the ranks of Turkey on the global Hofstede scales are somewhere in the middle of global society based on a sample of 62 countries: uncertainty avoidance index (18), power distance (25), indulgence versus restraint (27), individualism vs. collectivism (35), masculinity versus femininity (36) and long-term orientation (36). For the fi nal analysis we only considered the countries with complete values.
By contrast Inglehart, in some of his main publications, developed an interpretation of global value change (Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2003, 2005) , which rests on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change, which is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to over twenty key WVS variables from the originally more than 900 survey items on practically all major areas of human concern, from religion to politics to economic and social life. Factor analysis reduces variables to the underlying statistical dimensions.
Th e two Inglehart dimensions (see Inglehart and Baker, 2000, pp. 23-24) are: (i) the Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension and (ii) the Survival/Self-expression dimension. Th ese two dimensions also explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance in a factor analysis of ten indicators, and each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important variables. Th e factor scores generated by these 10 items listed previously are highly correlated with factor scores from his earlier research. In a statistical table in that landmark article, Inglehart and Baker also show the results from a factor analysis of variables with 165,594 WVS respondents (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, Table 1 ). As expected, the factor loadings are considerably lower than those at the national level.
For Inglehart and his associates, the rise of rational-secular values is an important element in socio-economic and democratic development. Self-expression values, as opposed to survival values, give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and the rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life. For Inglehart there is a dramatic shift in child-rearing values, from an emphasis on hard work towards an emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child in the course of socio-economic development. Societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust. Th e culture of trust and tolerance are crucial to democracy. Secularism (y-axis) and self-expression (x-axis) are but two sides of the same coin -modernity. Th e Inglehart School assumes the following global "map of human values". In our adaptation of the famous Inglehart map (Graph 1), we highlight the position of Turkey on it. Assuming that self-expression values rise in parallel with secular-rational values, it is clear that Turkey's path corresponds to the "global path".
[Graph 1: Map of global human values according to Inglehart and associates (our own adaptation) and the place of Turkey on it]
Our own calculations show that Tanzania, Puerto Rico and Jordan are the least secular countries of the world, while Sweden, Japan and the Czech Republic are the most secu-lar countries of the world. Turkey's ranking needs a special comment here: while Turkey is more religious than most West European countries, it is as religious as the United States, Poland, and the Latin American democracies Chile and Brazil. Its ranking at 49 of the 66 countries is not sensational, replicating the previously mentioned tendency from Hofstede's surveys. New Zealand, Australia and the United States are the most self-expression-oriented countries of the world, while all of the fi ve most survival oriented and least self-expression-oriented countries of the world were of Orthodox Christian cultural heritage: Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Romania. So, Turkey ranks 45 on the global self-expression scale, regarded by Inglehart and his associates to be so vital for "eff ective democracy". Turkey is ahead of several countries of the EU, reminding readers that self-expression values are defi ned by the priority to self-expression and quality-of-life, happiness, preparedness to sign a petition, tolerance vis-à-vis homosexuality, and trust in people. Th e results clearly suggest that the world of Christian Orthodoxy is the global region with the lowest self-expression values.
Our choropleth maps -Maps 1 and 2 -designed with Inglehart's data, further highlight these aspects of the Inglehart global map of human values. Generally, one refers to the "map of human values" nowadays in the context of the famous Graph, designed by Inglehart and his associates, shown in Graph 1 of this essay. However, the design of real choropleth maps, i.e. maps designed to show global statistics on an easily readable world maps, which simplify the global data range to up to nine, ten or eleven layers (high, medium, low) brings about important insights into the essence of social scientifi c theories, and -even at the price of oversimplifi cation -try to show to the audiences confronted with these theories where a given phenomenon is strongest or weakest.
[ (2000) also maintain that in traditional societies a main goal in life is to make one's parents proud and one must always love and respect one's parents, regardless of how they behave. Conversely, parents must do their best for their children even if their own well-being suff ers. People in traditional societies idealize large families, and they actually have them. However, extensive evidence indicates that these values tap into an intergenerational shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increased emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality-of-life concerns. In contrast to the hitherto dominant explanations, we introduce the dimension of the shadow economy, acceptance of corruption, and overall moral decay (see also Schneider, 2005 Torgler and Schneider, 2007) . And as we see in the results, this consideration of the dimension of economic permissiveness results in a signifi cant redrawing of the global maps of human values.
Th e overlooked role of the shadow economy in assessing global values
It is clear that Hofstede and Inglehart neglected a very important dimension of economic and social life -the shadow economy, which is becoming more and more important in the process of the further enlargement of the EU. Let us just take one important example -the evaluation of a randomly chosen current EU member candidate country, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Th e United States Department of States, in its country human rights report, issued in February 2014, refers to the government's failure to fully re-5(1)/2017 spect the rule of law, interfering in the judiciary and the media, and selective prosecution of political opponents, government corruption and police impunity, political interference, ineffi ciency, favoritism toward well placed persons, and corrupt judicial system. Shadow economic activity has been on rise and causing violations of laws and regulations, lowering tax revenue collections, statistical discrepancies, inequality, corruption and public budget defi cit and public debt problems for the state and its organizations. Th e shadow economy captures all the activities beyond measurement by offi cial activity. In all countries, there is evidence that the shadow economy has a signifi cant share of the overall economy. It is also labelled as hidden, black, underground, unobserved, unoffi cial, unrecorded, and parallel economies. Th e rise of the shadow economy around the world is attributed to the stronger presence of government activity, increase in tax rates, and the desire to escape taxes and regulatory restrictions. Tanzi and Schunecht (1997) , Tanzi (1999) , Schneider (2005) , Eilat and Zinnes (2002) , Ahumada et al. (2008) and Chaudhuri et al. (2006) shed light on these shadow economic activities, its measurement and development across developed, developing and transition economies. Tanzi (1999) suggests that the shadow economy thrives because of the presence of activities that are diffi cult to measure and tax.
Th ere are several factors identifi ed by researchers that are expected to have a negative association with the size of the shadow economy. Th ese include trust (D'Hernoncourt and Meon, 2012), and tax morale and quality of institutions (Torgler and Schneider, 2009 ). Th ree key factors whose extent has impacted the size of shadow economy are: debt, default risk, corruption and fi nancial development (Elgin and Uras, 2012; Blackburn et al., 2012) , Information Communication Technologies (ICT) (Indjikian and Siegel, 2005) and environmental violations (Biswas et al., 2012) . Schneider (2005) considers shadow economic activities a fact of life. Schneider (2005) defi nes the shadow economy to include all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: (i) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, (ii) to avoid payment of social security contributions, (iii) to avoid having to meet certain labour market legal standards, and (iv) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures. However, this definition does not include economic activities that are illegal and fi t the characteristics of classical crime, as well as the informal household economy or tax evasion.
In another approach Eilat and Zinnes (2002) treat the shadow economy as a distinct entity, instead of seeing it just as a symptom of policy failures of the transition countries. Th ey examine its short-term and dynamic consequences for development. Th e shadow economy is measured in two diff erent ways: fi rst, the electricity method which attributes growth in total electricity consumption in excess of growth in GDP to the shadow economy, and the second measure is a modifi ed electricity approach correcting for limitations in the fi rst approach.
Yet in a third approach, Ahumada et al. (2008) look at the monetary measure of the shadow economy where the money demand function, observed cash balances, and its variation which is explained by variables which induce agents to make hidden transactions, is used to estimate the size of the shadow economy. However, on econometric grounds, researchers have criticized the quantitative accuracy of this method. Th e critique is attributed to time series properties, structural breaks and sensitivity to units of measurement to lag the dependent variable and its initial condition.
Limited statistics from high income countries point to a positive trend in shadow economic activities development, but little is known yet about its magnitude in transition, low-income and emerging economies. Schneider (2005) estimates the shadow economy for 110 countries (66 developing, 23 transition and 21 industrialized OECD) observed for 1990/1991, 1994/1995 and 1999/2000 . Th e results provide some insights about the main causes and studies the dynamic eff ects of the shadow economy. Th e main causes of the shadow economy are found to be the tax and social security contribution burdens, the intensity of regulations and the low quality of public sector services.
Th e transition economies have undergone major changes. Increased unemployment, decline in GDP, a paralyzed bureaucracy and government corruption during this period saw a surge in the growth of shadow economic activities. Eilat and Zinnes (2002) conducted research on the shadow economy in transition countries. Th e objective was to use a policy perspective to fi nd out whether shadow economy is a "friend" or a "foe". Th e research was conducted in three parts: it lays out the theoretical and empirical backgrounds, it estimates the size of the shadow economy, and it examines its eff ects and discusses issues of policy implementation.
For the empirical part, Eilat and Zinnes (2002) measure the relative size of the shadow economy to offi cial GDP in 25 transition countries for the period 1990 to 1997. Th e patterns show that, once established, the shadow economy is hard to remove. Estimation results show that a dollar decline (rise) in offi cial GDP is attenuated by a shadow economic expansion (contraction) of 31 (25) cents. Finally, the authors examine whether the shadow economy prevents, slows down, or promotes economic growth and competitiveness, and through what mechanisms. In addition, they consider implications for policymaking that address the key questions and provide policy recommendations. Schneider (2005) , in the context of industrialized and transition economies, mentions that the shadow economy is expected to infl uence the tax system and its structure, the effi ciency of resource allocation between sectors, and the offi cial economy in a dynamic sense. Schneider (2005) concludes that for all countries investigated, the shadow economy as share of GDP has reached a remarkably large size (Africa 33.9%-41.2%; Americas 34.2%-41.5%; Asia 20.9%-26.3%; Transition countries 31.5%-37.9% and highly developed countries 13.2%-16.8%). Th e average percentage shares of GDP in all cases are increasing over time. Th e author demonstrates empirically a strong interaction of the shadow economy with government policies and with the offi cial economy. He draws three further conclusions. First, an increasing burden of taxation and social security payments, combined with rising state regulatory activities, are the major driving forces underlying the size and growth of the shadow economy. Second, the shadow economy has a statistically signifi cant and quantitatively important infl uence on the growth of the offi cial economy. Increases in the shadow economy have a negative eff ect on the offi cial growth in a developing country, but a positive eff ect in the developed industrialized and transition countries. Finally, shadow economies are a complex phenomenon, and are present in all types of economy. People engage in shadow economic activity because of government actions, most notably high levels of taxation and regulation.
Th ere are several factors that are expected to have a negative association with the size of shadow economy. Th ese include trust, tax morale, and quality of institutions. Some researchers use subjective variables such as perceptions, expectations, attitudes and motivations such as tax morale or institutional quality. Th e relationship between tax mo-5(1)/2017 rale and institutional quality and the shadow economy was investigated by Torgler and Schneider (2009) . Th e shadow economy is measured as a percentage of the offi cial GDP. WVS/European Values Survey data on cheating on taxes and Latinobarometro data on the justifi ability of avoiding paying taxes are measures of tax morale, and the quality of governance index is used as a proxy for institutional quality. Th ey use a multivariate analysis to examine the quantitative impact of these factors on the level of, and changes in, the shadow economy. Th ey fi nd strong support for the hypothesis that higher tax morale and a higher institutional quality lead to a smaller shadow economy.
Another factor with signifi cant potential impact on the size of shadow economy is trust. Trust can be a substitute to formal and legal contracts in a situation when the agents involved in shadow transactions cannot rely upon the formal legal system to enforce agreements or settle disputes. Th is view suggests that trust increases the size of the formal sector by negatively impacting the size of the informal sector. In this regard, D'Hernoncourt and Meon (2012) investigate the relationship between trust and the size of shadow economy. Th ey report a negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and generalized trust. Trust is defi ned as the trust index provided in the WVS data. Trust and the shadow economy are negatively related and trust matters more for developing countries.
Methodology
Following the introduction of the world-famous Human Development Index and its annual updates in the Human Development Report in recent years (see UNDP, 2013) a richer literature on the quantitative measurement of development outcomes has been developed. Th ese outcomes are oft en multidimensional and each of the dimensions is represented by several indicators with both positive and negative eff ects on the development outcome. In this study the objective is not only to evaluate the eff ects of certain policy programmes, but also to quantify the state of the outcome. Th e multidimensionality of the outcome requires the creation of composite indices to have a single measure of performance and also to aggregate the indicators to rank the units in one unique way.
Examples of such indices are studies of globalization and its impacts on inequality, poverty and economic growth. Concerning the measurement of globalization, Heshmati (2006a and 2006b) introduces two composite indices of globalization. Th ey indicate the level of globalization and show how it has developed over time for diff erent countries. Th e indices are composed of four main components: economic integration, personal contact, technology and political engagement, each generated from a number of indicators. Th e indices were also used in a regression analysis framework to study the causal relationships between income inequality, poverty, economic growth and globalization. Th e results show evidence of a weak and negative relationship between globalization and income inequality and poverty. An important index of globalization based on similar methodology, but comprehensive data is the KOF index (see also Dreher, Gaston and Martens, 2008) .
Th ere are at least two parametric indices employed for computing an index of a development process: the principal component (PC) or factor analysis (FA). In this paper, we introduce a Value Development Index, based on WVS data. Since the two methods in normalized form give PC scores with unit variance, the PC is more frequently used in the analysis of a development process. PC analysis is a multivariate technique used for examining relationships within a set of interrelated quantitative variables. Th e principal Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny 5(1)/2017 components computed; each is a linear combination of the original indicators with coefficients equal to the Eigen vectors of the correlation of the covariance matrix. Th e principal components are sorted according to the descending order of the Eigenvalues, which are equal to the variance of the components. PC analysis is a way to uncover approximate linear dependencies among the indicators.
As part of the analysis, the Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors are investigated. Only Eigenvalues bigger than 1.0 are used in the computation of development process indices. Th e Eigenvalues are declining from the fi rst component to other components. By looking at the Eigenvectors, it becomes evident which indicators form a specifi c component and the nature of their eff ects. In each sub-component, an indicator with an Eigenvector exceeding 0.30 is considered statistically as a signifi cant contributor to the principal component.
Each of the indices has its own advantages and disadvantages. Th ey can be used to measure the state of development among countries and attribute it to the possible underlying causes. A breakdown of the index into major components provides possibilities to identify positive and negative factors contributing to the development. Th e structure of the components is determined by the researcher. In practice the researchers use only the fi rst principal component in the computation of a parametric index and in the ranking of the countries studied. Th is method has the disadvantage in that it ignores the information embodied in the remaining indicators. One alternative to account for the information embodied in all principal components with an Eigenvalue bigger than one is to use a weighted average PC index. In the aggregation of the principal components, one can use their explained share of the total variance as weights. Th is method of aggregation will allow the utilization of information from all indicators of an outcome. Lim and Nguyen (2014) discuss alternative weighting approaches to computing indices of economic activity.
It should be emphasized that the PC method is generally a very useful method to reduce the complexity of the data with multi-dimensions. However, the linear combinations of the diff erent dimensions of interest may not always be easy to interpret. Th e factor analysis examined above and various methods of factor rotation have been conducted in the context of linear factor analysis of continuous variables. Th e standard linear factor-analytic methodologies do not work well for dichotomous items. Th is limitation has led to the development of nonlinear methods. In both cases, the determination of the association between items and factors is the same and is made using factor loading which is considered by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) as the correlation between the factor and items. Strongest loadings above a threshold value 0.3 or 0.4 are preferred. Nonlinear factor analysis is oft en used to identify both the presence and nature of multidimensionality in a set of test items. Th e loaded matrix is rotated in order to amplify the presence of simple unidirectional latent structures. Th is is a simple structure from a set of items as when each factor has a few items with high loadings and the rest have loadings near to zero. Finch (2006) conducted a simulation study to compare the performance of two commonly used methods of rotation, namely orthogonal (Varimax) and oblique (Promax) to identify the presence of a simple structure. Factor rotation involves a transformation of the initial factor loadings to obtain a more simple structure without changing the underlying mathematical relationships in the data. Finch suggests the nonlinear factor analysis rotation method as the preferred method. Orthogonal rotations assume the factors are uncorrelated, while the oblique rotations assume the factors are correlated. Th e former contains the correlation between the factors, while the later measures the relationship Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny 5(1)/2017 between the individual factors and items. Promax takes the rotated matrix provided by Varimax and raises the loadings to powers where the transformed loading values refl ect the simple structure better than in the case of Varimax (McLeod et al., 2001) . Th e results from the Flinch simulation suggest that the two approaches are equally able to recover the underlying factor structure, though the promax method is better in the identifi cation of the simple structure. Given confl icting recommendations in the literature, Dien et al. (2005) present a standard protocol for applying PC analysis to event-related potential datasets. Th e focus is on optimizing PC analysis with emphasis on matrix type, factor loading weighing, extraction and rotations using data simulations.
Re-analysis of Inglehart's data
As convincing as Inglehart's theory and the empirics of his contentions might appear at fi rst sight, several essays and books have questioned Inglehart's way of combining the analyzed variables into his dimensions or the linkage between his dimensions and democratic development (Hadenius, and Teorell, 2005; Haller, 2002; Haller and Hadler, 2006; Steenkamp and Geyskens, 2012; Tausch and Karoui, 2011; Tausch and Moaddel, 2009 ).
As we said, PC analysis or factor analysis with orthogonal standard rotation of factors is a convenient, but not always the best, way to reduce the relationships in a statistical correlation matrix between variables. It is of paramount importance to be clear here -what relationships exist between the factors, and which relationships are being allowed or we might even say are being dictated by the model? No correlations between the factors? Or are correlations being allowed? Th e statistical method chosen by Inglehart, derived by the initial PC analysis to arrive at his fi nal factor analytical results -the standard varimax rotation, which allows for no correlations between the chosen factors -today is increasingly being substituted in the literature by methods like the promax rotation, which allows for such correlations between the factors (Finch, 2006) . To make matters worse, Inglehart's choice of the WVS data did not always use the items which are the best available in a maximum number of countries and theoretically of importance at the same time. His analyses are based on a theoretical maximum of 146,789 global interviews refl ecting 22 variables; while we thought it more appropriate to base our analysis on a theoretical maximum of 180,041 global interviews for 30 variables.
In our research design, we avoided imputation of missing values and deleted observations with missing values. Th is may aff ect the representativeness of the data. At the end of the day, there were 92,289 persons around the globe with complete data for all the 30 variables of our research design. We worked with the very best documented WVS items. Seen in such a way, the present analysis is the biggest of its kind ever undertaken in social science history. Our "new" nine factors all very much make 'sense' and are free from problematic assumptions. We included all 30 original indicators, into the original principal components and later the promax factor analysis. Our research design was thus intended to be more straightforward and simple, and in addition, it uses a more advanced and up to date statistical methodology. In contrast to Inglehart, we also include background variables, such as gender, age and education (see Table 1 ). Th us, our analysis is no longer a "gender-free zone": [ Our re-analysis is based on 68 countries, and there are a good number of Muslim societies or predominantly Muslim societies with complete data covering all the 30 variables from around the globe. Th e choice of our variables from the WVS is provided in Table  2 . No substitution of missing values had to be carried out, and the SPSS 20 statistics programme was applied, with the default options for factor analysis/promax rotation in place. Th us, it is important to emphasize that access to the data allow researchers to reexamine the results presented here.
[ Table 2 : Th e choice of our variables from the World Values Survey] Th e WVS data we used correspond to 88.96% of the total global population and 84.75% of the world's Muslim population; and our re-analysis of the Inglehart world map of human values still yields results with complete data, which are a good sample of 56.89% of the global population and 56.16% of the global Muslim population. 
Th e fi nal factor analytical model
Graph 2 shows the Eigenvalues of our investigation; with the fi rst two factors way past any linear continuation of the factors 10-29, shown in the x-axis. Eight of our nine factors [economic permissiveness, traditional religion, racism, generational education gaps, distrust of the army and the press, authoritarian character, tolerance and respect, and the 'ego' company (independence + selfi shness) are not only well above Eigenvalue 1.0, but also way above the linear continuation of the Eigenvalues of factors 9-19. Following such a simple standard procedure of analyzing the Eigenvalues, we suggest treating the results for factor 9 -rejection of the market economy and democracy -with some caution at least. For that reason, our Table 3 lists these results with indented letters.
Although its Eigenvalue is still above 1.0, its vicinity to the factors 10-19 is clearly visible. In all, our model explains some 47% of the total variance of the correlation matrix of the data for 30 variables from more than 90,000 interview partners of the WVS, with two factors explaining more than 17% of the total variance in between them -economic permissiveness, and traditional religion, the two defi ning processes of global values and global value change today. We have highlighted all factor loadings from the rotated structure matrix (Promax rotation according to the SPSS 20 with Kaiser normalization) in diff erent typing and shadings in order to ease reading the results.
We should emphasize the point that the correlations between the factors are not correlations between aggregations at the country level but refl ect the correlations between the factors, to be extracted from the data at the individual level of more than 90,000 interview partners, across countries and across cultures. Under such conditions, correlations between factors of more than +/-0.10 are already to be considered high. Nevertheless, we have to emphasize that the relationships between economic permissiveness, and traditional religion, the factors with Eigenvalues of 2.0 or above, and the rest of the nine factors under consideration here, all with an Eigenvalue of 1.0 or above, in no way suffi ciently fi rmly confi rm the expectations of militant contemporary secularism.
Seven factors under consideration here are a new input for the entire global debate about human values. Th ese include: the strength of economic permissiveness; the clear proof of the existence of a factor describing racism; the generation gap in education, connected with the value transformation processes; the existence of a joint political distrust factor against both the army and the press; which also exists in very rich Western democracies;, the clear proof of an "authoritarian personality" factor and a re-emergence of the Hofstede dimension of "long term orientation", called here "the ego company". Two factors bear great resemblance to the results achieved by Inglehart and his associates -traditional religion and tolerance and respect and post-materialism (see Graph 2).
[Graph 2: Screenplot for our factor analysis] Table 3 shows the structure matrix -Promax with Kaiser normalization. Table 4 presents the correlations between the factors, Table 5 the aggregate country results and Table  7 the country ranks of global values. Th ese tables are now to be considered as the main basis of our further interpretations and form the nucleus of the new choropleth world maps of human values.
Th e new choropleth maps of global human values
Graph 1 depicted the Inglehart/Welzel map of human values. Th e real choropleth maps, Maps 3 to 11, designed by us on the basis of the preceding WVS data, now focus on our analysis and its geographical implications. Table 3 allow the assessing of the condensed  variable defi nitions, immediately following from Table 3 , and also to assess our list of the fi ve highest and lowest placed countries for each of our nine factors. Th e table is further complemented by nine choropleth maps, from Map 3 through to Map 11. 
Regional value diff erences at the sub-national level
Th e World Value Survey data also permit the research community to analyze the results not only at the national level, but also at the regional level, where the interviews were recorded. Th e idea that global values are oft en present in the nations of the world in a highly regionally contradictory pattern is relatively new in the research literature on the subject but has tremendous political and also international implications. First studies in this direction were published, among others, by Torgier and Schneider (2007) . Th e added value from the within country regional diff erentiation might be outweighed by the low level of reliability and validity of the results. In case of Turkey, minority rights and democracy are factors infl uencing its EU membership which justify accounting for regional value diff erences at the sub-national level. Of the global regions with more than 30 interview partners Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny 5(1)/2017
Th e 30 most racist and xenophobic cultures of the world are to be found in the following regions: On a European level, one should not underestimate the long-term implications of such fi ndings. It emerges, for example, that even in highly developed overseas democracies, regional value diff erences are considerable, as, say, between the deeply religious "Bible Belt" in the US South and the relatively secular New England. Secular Western Turkey quickly catches up with other European regions concerning the "Westernization" of values. Table  7 provides us with a fi rst overview of the highest and lowest placed regions in the current EU members and the EU-accession countries, ranked by an average Value Development Index score which is based on the factor analytical results, presented on the country to country level in Table 5 and on the Eigenvalues, presented in Graph 2 of this work. Th e factor analytical parametric index comprises the following variables: avoiding economic permissiveness; avoiding racism; avoiding distrust of the army and the press; avoiding the authoritarian character; tolerance and respect; and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy. Our Table 7 suggests huge regional diff erences within the EU, which will increase even more aft er the next proposed round of EU-enlargement.
Th e results from Table 8 reveal some very unfortunate results about the still persistent absence of a climate of social tolerance in some Turkey's regions. Of all global regions with available data with 30 or more interview partners per region, the Turkish region of Western Marmara ranked at 13 for the presence of an authoritarian character, and the Eastern Black Sea region was ranked 41 of the more than 500 classifi ed regions on this scale. Central Anatolia was global rank of 18 in the global scale of regional racism, and the Western Black Sea region was ranked 31 on this indicator. Central Anatolia was down at the very bottom of global regions with an achieved rank of 457 in the scale of tolerance and respect and post-materialism, while the rankings for the Aegean region and partly also Istanbul were much more favourable.
[ Table 7 : Th e rankings of the best and the worst ranked regions in the EU and the candidate and potential candidate countries]
[ Table 8 : Th e rank of Turkish regions in the geography of global values]
Turkey -a Torn Country? Conclusions and Perspectives
In the following, we will use factor analytical scores to calculate a new Global Value Development Index, which uses the measurement scales (factors) of our work, and which hopefully will be recognized by religious and non-religious readers alike as measurement scales. Th ese scales express the true degree of development of a civil society of a country, independent from the extent of traditional religion in the country, and also independent from the educational gap, and also independent from the factor "ego company", where different cultural codes of global society might sharply diverge on the assessment on whether this is a "good" or "bad phenomenon". Th us, our Global Value Development Index country score combines: avoiding permissiveness; pessimism; avoiding racism; avoiding distrust of the army and the press; avoiding the authoritarian character; tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy. Th e weight, given to each factor, corresponds to the Eigenvalues listed in Graph 2 of this work.
We have to emphasize at the outset that the six dimensions combine phenomena where Turkey is among the top 30% of global society, i.e. avoiding economic permissiveness and avoiding the distrust of the army and the press as the long-lasting infl uences of Kemalism on Turkish society at large. Th e combined indicator also includes two components where Turkey's performance is rather mediocre compared to other countries (tolerance and respect and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy), while the results for avoiding racism and for avoiding the authoritarian character are among the bottom 20% of global society. Due to the positive performance concerning economic morality and also the trust in the empirically most important two pillars of a free and democratic society -the army and the press -and the weight that these factors have in the overall model of global values, the overall Turkish performance, emerging from Table 9 , is quite positive. However, we have to emphasize that this performance corresponds -as the chapter heading suggests -to the experience of a culturally much divided country.
Our country results show that the fi ve best ranked countries of our entire globe are all western democracies with a solid historical anchoring of their societies in the traditions of liberal Enlightenment: Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia. But we already fi nd among the next fi ve countries the two developing countries, Vietnam and Tanzania, and the EU-member countries Italy (predominantly Roman Catholic), Finland (predominantly Protestant) and Canada. Our global value development index, combining law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect; and a high acceptance of the market economy and democracy, ranks the predominantly Muslim nation of Morocco twelft h -just behind the United States of America -and still ahead the Latin American democracy Uruguay and Germany, to be followed by Bosnia and Indonesia.
[ Table 9 : Th e rankings of the countries of the world based on a new Global Value Development Index] While in general terms, our analysis is quite optimistic about the civil society foundations for a stable democracy for several Muslim countries, including Morocco, Bosnia, Indonesia, Turkey and Jordan, our analysis is fairly pessimistic for the former communist countries and successor states of the former Soviet Union, predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Th ey excel hardly anywhere by an overwhelmingly positive perfor-mance, while the history of communism, which began to be implemented in Russia in 1917, destroyed the religious fabric of society and left a hyper-authoritarian society in its place. Russia's percentile performance scores, which might be interpreted as a serious question mark about Russia's future trajectory, are the following: the 'ego' company (18%), avoiding the distrust of the army and the press (61%), avoiding economic permissiveness (78%), tolerance and respect (79%), avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy (87%), traditional religion (100%) and avoiding the authoritarian character (100%).
Our map, built on the results of Table 9 , also shows that some of the assumptions made by European decision makers, which pushed EU enlargement ahead of democratic consolidation aft er the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, are wrong. Th e degree of development of a democratic civil society, characterized by law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy is very poorly developed in several of the countries, admitted into the EU in 2004 and aft er. Our choropleth map of global value development (Map 12) then summarizes the results of Table 9 at a glance.
[Map 12: Combined global value development index] It is also interesting to note how neighbouring countries, diverge in their value patterns: just compare Uruguay and Brazil, both predominantly Roman Catholic; Italy and Hungary, both predominantly Roman Catholic, Morocco and Mali, both predominantly Muslim, or for that matter, Morocco and Spain, just separated by the Straits of Gibraltar; Tanzania and Zambia, two neighbouring African countries, and Vietnam and Th ailand, two Asian neighbouring countries. While Uruguay, Italy, Morocco, Tanzania and Vietnam are real frontrunners in overall value development, we fi nd that Brazil; Hungary, Mali, Zambia, and Th ailand are real laggards in global value development. Th ese phenomena hold independently of the attained development level of a country, measured by the Human Development Index of the UNDP. All of a sudden, we discover how exceptional countries such as Uruguay, Italy, Morocco, Tanzania and Vietnam really are, and that global social science research would do well to focus on the value structures in these countries.
As we already noted, however, Turkey's overall performance is mainly due to its good ranking in the fi eld of economic morality and also by the trust of its public in the pillars of a free and democratic society. Using again the factor analytical method for the indicators: avoiding racism, absence of an authoritarian character, tolerance and respect, and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy, we however realize that Turkey is only ranked 61 of the global scale of 67 classifi ed countries. Since such a ranking immediately follows from Tables 5 and 10 , this contention does not need a further proof here. Of all the nations on earth with available data, there is a very high racism, a very pronounced authoritarian character, little tolerance and respect and postmaterialism, and a relatively high rejection of democracy and the market economy. Table 10 shows the factor analytically weighted results -with the Eigenvalues as the weights for the factors. For Turkey's accession to the EU, these results imply an important agenda for the future: the state of law and secular democracy in Turkey and respect for minority rights must be strengthened. Th e recent announcement that there will be special prisons for persons with a homosexual sexual orientation must be interpreted as the very last event in a recent long chain of actions on the part of the current, incumbent Turkish administration to de-Westernize the country in the name of a mystical "Ummah" instead of liberal democracy.
[ Table 10 : Turkey's global ranking on tolerance and democracy indicators] Just how important the dimension of tolerance, respect and postmaterialism is for "effective democracy" we realize when we look at the bi-variate scatterplots on liberal values as the drivers of "eff ective democracy", which we defi ne with Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel, 2012 as the combination of civil rights with the absence of corruption (Graph 3).
[Graph 3: Liberal values as drivers of "eff ective democracy"] In the long run, we are optimistic about the human development and security. All social scientifi c evidence seems to suggest that Turkey is indeed on a path to long-lasting changes and societal re-alignments. Among all the available social indicators of the world, infant mortality per 1.000 live births is among the most reliable, direct and completely documented indicator of the presence or absence of mass poverty. Th e economic basis for future coming changes in Turkey is the positive social development during the last decade and a half, which we can witness at the World Bank's data site with infant mortality, in 2016, at 11, down from the 171.1 in 1960. We realize at once how deeply AKP rule has transformed the formerly poor Turkish villages and urban Gecekondular (shanty towns). Th is social change is also evident from the fact that from 2000 onwards, Turkey, as of 2012, increased its global ranking in overcoming infant mortality by another spectacular improvement of 16 ranking places, only surpassed by Iran, South Korea, China and Tunisia.
Increased human development, rising life expectancy and reduced infant mortality are all a sign of rising human security. One of the robust lessons of global value research is that with increasing human security, peoples' longings for democracy, tolerance and civil society will increase. Issues of post-materialism will become important, precisely for those young generations, who could aff ord themselves a decent education at one of the country's thriving Universities, including from Turkey's rapidly increasing middle class. Th eir parents and grandparents were lift ed out of poverty during the last decades. But as so oft en happens in history, a particular social and political movement might have served a country well for a longer period, only to be confronted with the situation that the very policies of a given regime reach its limits, and changed a country for the better, entering a period for which the thought patterns and receipts of the successful past no longer fi t the needs of the future. Democracy, post-materialism, urban development, gender issues, and a "soft " and humanistic reading of the great plural religious heritage of the country will become the order of the day, precisely corresponding to the predictions of the theories of value change, which we presented in this essay.
Many European country experts on Turkey would agree with Szymanski's opinion (Szymanski, 2016a (Szymanski, , 2016b ) that before the rule of the Justice and Development Party as well as aft er 2002 Turkey is still a secular state and not a confessional state or post-secularism meaning a defi nite departure from secularism. But its shape is changing as a result of a number of processes and socio-political phenomena occurring in Turkey aft er World War II, which make this change possible, made to varying degrees in diff erent periods (see also Wodka, 2017) .
To wind up our comparisons, we have calculated our results with population weighted averages for the Anglo-Saxon overseas democracies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States), which are the real frame of reference of any EU-2020 or European "Lisbon Strategy" comparison; the EU countries with available data (Bulgaria; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Estonia; Finland; Germany; Hungary; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden), Turkey and Russia (Table 11 and Graph 4). In terms of a "Lisbon strategy" to make Europe the most advanced economic and social region on earth, performing better than the United States or, for that matter, Australia, Canada, or New Zealand, Turkey's accession to the EU will not provide a critical mass of positive assets of values, like avoiding racism; avoiding the authoritarian character; tolerance and respect; and avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy.
[ Table 11 : Population-weighted value development indices for the Anglo-Saxon overseas democracies, the EU, Turkey, the countries of the West Balkan and the Russian Federation]
[Graph 4: Population-weighted value structures for selected countries and country groups]
Yeşilada and Noordijk (2010) had previously come to the conclusion that the Turkish public has become more conservative (traditional on the Inglehart-Welzel factor of the traditional-secular/ rational scale) during the period of 1995 to 2005. Th eir fi ndings indicate that this is not a phenomenon that started with the election of the AKP in 2002. Th e authors maintain that it is a trend that can be traced to 1995 and has intensifi ed toward more conservatism since then. Our essay confi rms their basic analysis. At the same time, Yeşilada and Noordijk think that a slight but signifi cant shift in survival-self-expression values was observed: a regressive shift from 1990 to 2000 followed by a slight return toward more self-expression in 2005. Since 1994 the Turkish electorate as a bloc, Yeşilada and Noordijk argue, has moved to the right of the political spectrum. Th e authors suggest that Turkish society is far from values observed in many EU member states with respect to religiosity and Inglehart and Welzel's values map. Abdollahian, Coan, Oh and Yeşilada (2012) were, however, correct in pointing out the basic dilemma for the AKP leadership under Erdoğan: Turkey, as a high-performer on the Human Development Index dimension, will sooner or later face the enormous pressures in the direction of democratization and self-expression values, which any society around the globe faces when human development is in a rapid and positive direction. Th e authors say that economic progress has important implications for the evolution of rational-secular and self-expression value orientations. Specifi cally, the interactive relationship between progress and value orientations suggests, Abdollahian et al. argue, that major changes in existential conditions moderate the ebb and fl ow of cultural evolution. Th e expected rate of change in both rational-secular values and self-expression are related to where a nation is located in the development process. Moreover, Abdollahian et al. (2012) derive predictions about a zone of democratic transition and a zone of revolutionary change. Revolutionary change in political institutions suggests pronounced forces for change when political expectations fail to align with political realities. Nations could become trapped in an oscillating system characterized by unmet demands for political change and instability. Economic progress is a necessary condition for successful secularization and expressive political behaviour, which precede lasting democratic institutions. Th e real test for Erdoğan and the AKP will come when Turkey enters the phase of information and knowledge-based services and will evermore face the impact that technology has on culture, politics, and development. In Huntington's view "A bridge... is an artifi cial creation connecting two solid entities but is part of neither. When Turkey's leaders term their country a bridge, they euphemistically confi rm that it is torn." (Huntington 1996: 149) Graph 4 and Table 11 support our contention that the member countries of the EU and the European Commission should carefully weigh the costs and benefi ts of further enlargements, also in terms of the value balances in comparison to the world's leading democracies and the rising democracies in Latin America and other regions of the world, which conform much better to the essence of the values of the Enlightenment.
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